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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for criminal cartels
17 results foundAuthor: Larence, Eileen R. Title: Criminal Cartel Enforcement: Stakeholder Views on Impact of 2004 Antitrust Reform Are Mixed, but Support Whistleblower Protection Summary: Criminal cartel activity, such as competitors conspiring to set prices, can harm consumers and the U.S. economy through lack of competition and overcharges. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s leniency program offers the possibility that the first individual or company that self-reports cartel activity will avoid criminal conviction and penalties. In 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) was enacted to encourage such reporting. The 2010 reauthorization mandated that GAO study ACPERA’s effect. This report addresses (1) the extent that ACPERA affected DOJ’s criminal cartel enforcement, (2) the ways ACPERA has reportedly affected private civil actions, and (3) key stakeholder perspectives on rewards and antiretaliatory protection for whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust violations. GAO analyzed DOJ data on criminal cartel cases (1993-2010) and interviewed DOJ officials. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders including other antitrust attorneys selected using a snowball sampling technique whereby GAO identified contacts through referrals. What GAO Recommends -- Congress may wish to consider an amendment to add a civil remedy for those who are retaliated against for reporting criminal antitrust violations. DOJ generally agreed with GAO’s findings but did not comment on this matter. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. GAO, 2011. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-619: Accessed July 26, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11619.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11619.pdf Shelf Number: 122164 Keywords: AntitrustCriminal CartelsFinesFraudWhistleblowers |
Author: Shaffer, Gregory C. Title: Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend? Summary: Countries in virtually every region of the world are criminalizing cartel offenses. Many have initiated prosecutions, several have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time. Yet outside the United States the enforcement record is hardly uniform, and the debate about cartel criminalization is far from resolved. This situation raises a host of questions. What spurred the trend toward cartel criminalization? Have the changes been driven primarily by criminalization evangelists such as the United States Department of Justice, whether working bilaterally or through transnational networks? Are organic, bottom-up, national processes also at work, suggesting changing moral sensibilities regarding cartel conduct? To what extent have formal legal changes been accompanied by enhanced enforcement? This Essay tackles these questions through a review of criminalization and enforcement developments in the United States, Europe, and around the world. While the emerging legal landscape of anti-cartel activity is complex and varies significantly by jurisdiction, the clear trend is toward increased criminalization, as well as more robust enforcement, including collaboration among national antitrust authorities through informal transgovernmental networks. The trends, however, are not uniform, and the implementation of formal legal changes is an open question in light of divergent institutional contexts and social attitudes regarding cartels. Details: Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota School of Law, 2011. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-26: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865971 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865971 Shelf Number: 122639 Keywords: Criminal CartelsCriminal NetworksCriminal Organizations |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico Summary: Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children’s weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico’s barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the “live and let live” ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Shelf Number: 122800 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceVigilantismViolent Crime |
Author: The World Bank. Central America Unit, Poverty Reduction Title: Crime and Violence in Central America: Volume II Summary: Central America‘s hopes for a rebirth following the resolution of the region‘s civil wars have been marred by the torrent of violence which has engulfed El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala and begun to threaten Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. In addition to the pain and suffering experienced by victims, crime and violence exacts high costs, diverting investment, reducing economic growth, and undermining confidence in the region‘s fragile democracies. Among the key drivers of crime and violence in the region are drug trafficking, youth violence and gangs, the widespread availability of guns, and weak criminal justice institutions. Proven evidence-based prevention measures coupled with criminal justice reform can reduce crime and violence. Key messages and recommendations from the report include the following: 1) Crime and violence should be understood as a development issue. The high rates of crime and violence in the region have direct effects on human welfare in the short-run and long-run effects on economic growth and social development. Estimates of the effect on violence on growth imply that reducing crime could substantially boost growth in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 2) The strongest single explanation for the high rates of violence in the region—and their apparent rise in recent years—is drug trafficking, principally the transport of cocaine from producer nations in the south to the consumer market in the United States. The drug trade contributes to the widespread availability of firearms, generates violence within and between drug cartels, and spurs further lawlessness by undermining criminal justice institutions. Controlling for other factors, areas with intense levels of drug trafficking in Central America have homicide rates 65 percent higher than other areas in the same country. Murder rates are also higher in areas with greater shares of female-headed households and larger populations of young men. Overall crime victimization rates are at their most extreme in the region‘s capitals and other large cities. 3) The countries of the region have under-invested in prevention approaches which have proven effective in reducing crime and violence elsewhere. A public expenditure analysis on crime and violence prevention undertaken for this study in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama shows that spending has been modest for crime prevention measures. Crime prevention through environmental design and urban renewal programs can generate rapid decreases in property crime and inter-personal violence. Integrated citizen security approaches, combining modern methods of policing with prevention interventions by both government and non-governmental organizations, have seen initial success in El Salvador and should be tried elsewhere. The public health approach, which focuses on addressing risk factors for violent conduct, is especially promising for addressing violence against women and youth violence. 4) The criminal justice systems of several countries in the region have been deeply corrupted by drug trafficking, enabling traffickers to take advantage of existing institutional weaknesses, and the mano dura (―iron fist‖) approach has proven largely ineffective and possibly counterproductive. In some countries, the police have largely lost the trust of citizens; nearly half of Salvadorans and Hondurans and 2 out of 3 Guatemalans believe their local police are involved in crime. Clearly, improving criminal justice systems is essential. This includes reforming the judiciary, attorneys generals offices, and police forces. An especially urgent priority is ensuring strong accountability of the criminal justice system to citizens. This should be done through an inter-institutional approach, focusing on transparent selection, promotion, and sanctioning mechanisms. The optimization of court administration and case management with internal processes reengineering—such as the development of management information systems and performance indicators—provide important mechanisms to better diagnosis problems, track system outputs, monitor reform programs, and rationalize resources. 5) There are multiple possible entry points to integrate violence and crime prevention into policy. In one instance, the most promising approach may be in the context of a slum upgrading or municipal development project. In another, it may be in the context of reform of the health service. In a third, it may be in the context of reform of the criminal justice system. There is no one ―ideal‖ approach. The common denominator is that successful interventions are evidence-based, starting with a clear diagnostic of types of violence and risk factors and ending with a careful evaluation of the intervention‘s impact to inform future actions. 6) Drug trafficking poses a major challenge to Central American governments. The experiences of Mexico and Colombia, economic theory, and the historical record in the United States all suggest that an escalation of interdiction efforts—at any scale the Central American governments could mount, even with assistance from abroad—would most likely increase levels of violence without diminishing the capacities of drug traffickers. Consequently, marginal funds are more likely to reduce violence if devoted to crime prevention efforts and criminal justice reforms. 7) Gun ownership is an outgrowth of the drug trade and the history of civil conflict in some countries. Within these environments, which promote the demand for weapons, reducing gun ownership is a difficult undertaking. Regional and international evidence shows that the implementation and enforcement of firearms legislation, such as a ban on carrying firearms, combined with supply-side measures, such as controlling secondary firearms markets, are the most promising to reduce availability of firearms and reduce armed violence. National firearms policies are unlikely to reduce the availability of weapons unless they are undertaken as part of a regional approach with international efforts to stem the flow of contraband weapons from abroad, particularly Mexico and the United States. 8) The victims and perpetrators of violent crime are largely young men. In Central America as in the rest of the world, men age 15-34 account for the overwhelming majority of homicide victims, and they also comprise the membership of youth gangs. While gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the very limited evidence indicates they are responsible for only a minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest perhaps 15 percent of homicides are gang-related. To address issues of youth violence, policy makers in the short run should borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools, and opening schools after-hours and on weekends to offer youth activities to occupy their free time. While many programs to reduce youth violence have been introduced in the region, few if any have been subject to rigorous impact evaluation. Impact evaluations should systematically document what works in youth violence prevention in Central America. 9) Major data gaps hinder policy making. Several countries of the region have made substantial progress in recent years in improving their mechanisms for recording crime, particularly homicides. Such efforts should be continued and paired with expanded use of crime information systems, which experience in other areas has shown can be a valuable tool to direct criminal justice efforts. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010. 187p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 56781-LAC: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Eng_Volume_II_Crime_and_Violence_Central_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Central America URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Eng_Volume_II_Crime_and_Violence_Central_America.pdf Shelf Number: 123152 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingGang ViolenceGun ControlHomicidesViolent Crime (Central America) |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: Criminal Organizations and Illicit Trafficking in Guatemala’s Border Communities Summary: Contraband routes in Guatemala traditionally controlled by local groups are coming ever more under the control of the Mexican cartels. Around half of the nation’s territory is believed to be under the control of criminal organizations. Local criminal organizations have long penetrated the Guatemalan police, army, courts and government, and Guatemala’s gangs are extremely violent. However, the Mexican cartels with their financial resources, military grade weapons, and reputation for indiscriminate killing and brutality have elevated these threats. Today Guatemala and its neighbors Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador, have homicide rates among the highest in the world. Guatemala’s murder rate is as high as those during the worst years of the civil wars in the 1980’s. Impunity for traffickers and murderers is the rule, not the exception. Drug trafficking networks operate most intensely in communities along or near smuggling routes, many of which are located in border regions. Guatemala has more than 800 miles of borders which cross forests and mountain ranges and are seldom monitored or even marked. The communities close to the borders tend to be rural and engaged in subsistence farming often with little or no government presence in the form of clinics, schools, or police. Without the presence of state institutions, these communities are left vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal groups which use a variety of tactics, including not only threats and violence but also the distribution of money, public services, and other benefits to obtain compliance, acceptance, and even the support of local residents. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2011. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Guatemala URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/IPR%2015225.pdf Shelf Number: 124277 Keywords: Border SecurityCounternarcoticsCriminal CartelsDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Guatemala; Latin America; Central |
Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto Title: Living in Fear: Social Penetration of Criminal Organizations in Mexico Summary: Citizens in Mexico are trapped in between two illegitimate forces { the criminal organizations and the police who are supposed to protect them. Through the use of list experiments within the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM), we measure the pervasiveness of drug gang activity as it pertains to strategies of coercion (extortion) and co- optation (offering help) to ordinary citizens. The paper seeks to provide a better understanding of which groups are most vulnerable and where is it that drug gangs have become most embedded in society. Our findings suggest that although narcotra cantes extort citizens the most in high violence regions and the police does so in low violence ones, both forms of extortion are present everywhere in Mexico. This has triggered a spiral of fear: drug gangs signal unambiguously that they are in control, they overtly operate in many of Mexico's localities, while the police can't credibly signal that they can regain control of the streets. Police corruption is hence an essen- tial part of the story of Mexico's violence. Ever more fearful citizens have turned to the narcos for help, we demonstrate, and hence many tacitly {or even openly{ support them. Public strategies emphasizing military action and harsh treatment might not affect the social embeddedness that protects drug gangs and criminal organizations, even though it is a necessary action in the short-run. Instead, enhancing citizen trust within communities by effectively cleaning the police forces while improving the adjudication of justice are more likely to strengthen the social fabric. Details: San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2012 at: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Shelf Number: 124810 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug ViolenceGangsOrganized Crime (Mexico)Police Corruption |
Author: American Land Forces Institute Title: Transnational Criminal Networks in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Network-Centric Enterprise Summary: The purpose of this study is to understand the networks involved in transnational criminal organizations across Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. This study uses Social Network Analysis and general socio-cultural analysis techniques to analyze information gathered from open source news media, secondary data collections, analyses conducted by academics and nonprofit organizations, and interviews with former law enforcement officials. . This study analyzes the criminal organizations of each region (Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean) in terms of their (1) historical background, (2) hierarchy and composition, (3) alliances and rivalries with other regional criminal organizations, (4) major criminal activities, (5) recruitment methods and sources, and (6) weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Details: Mico, TX: American Land Forces Institute, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2012 at: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Central America URL: http://alfinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Crime-Families.pdf Shelf Number: 126810 Keywords: Criminal CartelsCriminal NetworksDrug TraffickingGangsOrganized CrimeSocial Network AnalysisTransnational Crime (Latin America, Caribbean) |
Author: Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Fusion Center, Intelligence & Counterterrorism Division Title: The Texas Gang Threat Assessment 2011 Summary: This assessment analyzes the relationship of gangs to cartels, gangs transnational criminal connections, type and frequency of crimes perpetrated by gangs, the level of violence perpetrated by gangs in their criminal activity, the geographic reach of gangs including the nature of a gang alliances, the size of gangs, effectiveness in organizing members under its leadership across the state, presence in schools, and recent convictions of gang members. The key analytic judgments of this assessment are: • Gangs represent a significant public safety threat to the State of Texas and are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime in our communities. Of incarcerated members of Tier 1 and Tier 2 gangs, more than half are serving a sentence for a violent crime, including robbery (25 percent), homicide (15 percent), and assault/terroristic threat (13 percent). • The Tier 1 gangs in Texas are Texas Mexican Mafia (estimated at 6,000 members), Tango Blast (8,000 members), Texas Syndicate (3,800 members), and Barrio Azteca (3,000 members). These organizations pose the greatest gang threat to Texas due to their relationships with Mexican cartels, large membership numbers, high levels of transnational criminal activity, and organizational effectiveness. • Mexican cartels continue to use gangs in Texas as they smuggle drugs, people, weapons, and cash across the border. Members of Tier 1 gangs have been recruited by the cartels to carry out acts of violence both in Texas and in Mexico. • Cartel connections are not limited to Tier 1 gangs. For example, members of the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, a Tier 3 gang, were contracted by the Gulf Cartel in an October 2011 incident that resulted in a law enforcement officer in Hidalgo County being shot and wounded. • Gang activity in Texas is growing, with the current number of gang members possibly exceeding 100,000; national gang membership estimates have increased 40 percent over the past two years. More than 2,500 gangs operate throughout the state, ranging from small gangs with few members and limited geographic reach to large gangs composed of thousands of members operating in all regions of Texas. • Some gangs focus their recruitment on juveniles, seeking them out on the internet and in schools and neighborhoods. Gangs are responsible for a significant portion of juvenile crime in Texas. Gang members accounted for more than half of all juvenile commitments to the Texas Youth Commission in 2010, while one in seven formal referrals to juvenile probation in Texas involves a juvenile confirmed or suspected to have a gang affiliation. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Department of Public Safety, 2011. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 6, 2012 at: http://alfinstitute.org/alfi_documents/Texas_Gang_TA_2011_Final.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://alfinstitute.org/alfi_documents/Texas_Gang_TA_2011_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 126891 Keywords: Barrio AztecaCriminal CartelsGang ViolenceGangs (Texas)Mexican MafiaTexas Syndicate |
Author: Rush, Mathew C. Title: Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in Texas: Political Discourse and an Argument for Reality Summary: In 2006, Mexico President Felipe Calderon, with U.S. assistance, launched a military campaign to combat Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in attempt to disrupt the growing violence throughout Mexico. The result has been an uncontrollable drug war that has claimed more lives within Mexico than the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. From the U.S. perspective, the threat of spillover violence emanating from Mexico is a wicked problem and one that polarizes the political discourse. Conflicting opinions about the meaning of spillover violence has driven misrepresentation of events and evidence that fuel the political narrative. Therefore, no metric for analysis can be put in place to accurately document and monitor the threat to the U.S. homeland. The term spillover violence, instead, has become the focal point. This research seeks to find a broader framework outside of political agendas that provides analysis in a systematic manner rather than focusing on semantics. This research identifies gaps in the understanding of how spillover violence is defined and captured within the current construct; examines current criminal metrics used to classify and report violent crime statistics; and evaluates the scope of Texas border operations dedicated toward violent crime crossing the Southwestern border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 5, 2013 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Shelf Number: 127478 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityOrganized CrimeViolent Crime (Texas, U.S.) |
Author: Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo Title: Security, Drugs, and Violence In Mexico: A Survey. 7th North American Forum, Washington, DC, 2011 Summary: The survey is composed by five sections. The first one is a diagnosis with two components. The first one is a brief description of Mexico’s security institutions. The survey includes a brief update of the most significant changes on these institutions during the last year, especially a report on the current situation of the police forces. The second component has to do with the present dynamics of Mexican organized crime. Here, the survey provides an account of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, including the different criminal activities these organizations perform, their geographic distribution, and the relationships among them. Also, the fragmentation of some of these organizations is described, and a new typology of cartels is included. The second section is about organized crime violence. Considering that violence trends are changing quickly this survey includes a general update of the phenomenon. In addition to the factors that explain increases of violence, the survey also points out the main factors that explain the geographic dispersion of violence as well as its regional specifics. The third section reviews the government’s strategy and actions against organized crime. This section includes an analysis of the outcomes of the Federal Government’s deployment of the force against organized crime through “joint operations” (operativos conjuntos), and an assessment of the government’s security policy impact on violence levels. The fourth section describes the general traits of the Mexican and North American drug markets. Finally, the fifth section addresses Mexican public opinion; it brings together the results of recent polls regarding security and government actions against organized crime, and provides an account of the government’s communication strategy on security issues. This Survey’s Data Sources The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from two databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies. The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 30,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte, El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno. This database is complementary to the official one, which has not been updated since December 2010. The second database contains information on 1,029 messages placed by criminal organizations next to corpses of executed individuals. Details: Mexico: Lantia Consultores, S.C., 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Shelf Number: 127617 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Is More Getting Us Less? Real Solutions for Securing Our Border Summary: Ongoing reports about Mexico’s bloody conflict with organized crime have raised again the question of whether the United States should do more to prevent such violence from “spilling over” into the country. While officials have documented few cases of actual “spill over,” fears of exploding violence in Mexico and concerns about illegal migration are driving a policy debate that is centered on “securing the border.” To whit, President Barack Obama announced last May the deployment of 1,200 more National Guard troops to enhance border security, and requested an additional $500 million from Congress to further modernize southwestern border security. In August, the U.S. Congress approved a $600 million “Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010” in near record time. The question is whether such policy actions are effective. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Shelf Number: 127619 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal CartelsOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Title: Justice at the Barrel of a Gun: Vigilante Militias in Mexico Summary: A rapid expansion in 2013 of vigilante militias – civilian armed groups that claim to fight crime – has created a third force in Mexico’s ongoing cartel-related violence. Some of these militias contain well-meaning citizens and have detained hundreds of suspected criminals. However, they challenge the government’s necessary monopoly on the use of force to impart justice. As the militias spread, there is also concern some are being used by criminal groups to fight their rivals and control territory. The Peña Nieto administration needs to develop a coherent policy for dealing with the vigilantes, so that it can work with authentic community policing projects while stopping the continued expansion of unregulated armed groups; this also requires demonstrating that the state has sufficient capacity to restore law and order on its own. If the government fails to deal with this issue, militias could spread across the country, triggering more violence and further damaging the rule of law. President Peña Nieto had expected to have to cope with the well-armed, ruthless cartels that dominate portions of the country, as well as the problems presented by uncoordinated national, state and municipal law enforcement bodies and a legacy of impunity. The appearance of a growing number of armed groups in at least nine of the 31 states, from close to the U.S. border to the south east, however, has added another dangerous level of complexity to the security challenge. Their epicentre, on which this briefing concentrates, is in the Pacific states of Guerrero and Michoacán, where thousands of armed men participate in a range of vigilante organisations. There have been more than 30 killings there since January 2013, either by or against the vigilantes, and they have become increasingly worrying hotspots of insecurity. While the vigilante killings are still only a fraction of the more than 5,000 cartel-related murders that took place across Mexico in the first five months of Peña Nieto’s administration, the concern is that this new type of violence could expand across the land. The violence has coincided with protests against government reforms in these states, including road blockades and looting of food trucks that are part of a broader challenge to authority. The government launched a major security offensive in Michoacán in May that has weakened the militia presence there, at least in the short term. In Guerrero, the state government has made agreements with some militia leaders in an attempt to lessen their impact. However, various vigilante groups are still active, and some of the core problems of insecurity that led to their presence are unresolved. The vigilantism issue is complicated by the fact that many communities, particularly indigenous, have a centuries-old tradition of community policing. Many groups have shown themselves to be successful and have demonstrated legitimate ways of providing security. However, it is legally ambiguous how far such community groups can go in bearing arms and imparting justice. Furthermore, many of the new militias copy the language and claim the same rights as these community police, even though they do not come from a local tradition or are not even rooted in indigenous communities. The government needs to work with the authentic and unarmed community police and clearly define the parameters of what they can and cannot do. Some rules can be established on the basis of guidelines that are being developed under state and federal laws or by expanding agreements being worked out between state governments and community leaders. In some cases, the government needs to require the disarmament of vigilante groups; in yet others, it needs to more aggressively detain and prosecute militias with criminal links. But the government also needs to significantly improve security in all the communities where militias have been formed. Many residents have taken up arms because the state has systematically failed to protect them. The clamour for security is legitimate; but justice is better served through functional state institutions than the barrels of private guns. Details: Mexico City/Bogota/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Latin America Briefing N°29: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/b029-justice-at-the-barrel-of-a-gun-vigilante-militias-in-mexico.aspx Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/b029-justice-at-the-barrel-of-a-gun-vigilante-militias-in-mexico.aspx Shelf Number: 128879 Keywords: Criminal CartelsGun Violence (Mexico)HomicidesOrganized CrimeVigilantesViolent Crime |
Author: Dugato, Marco Title: Measuring OC in Latin America. A methodology for developing and validating scores and composite indicators for measuring OC at national and subnational level Summary: The aim of this working paper is to develop and test a methodology for measuring Organized Crime (henceforth OC) in selected countries of the Latin American region. This study is one of the first systematic attempts to obtain reliable and comparable measurements of OC presence and threats in that region. The outcomes will provide a more comprehensive view on how to measure and analyze OC today in Latin America, taking the regional specificities of the phenomenon into account. Moreover, creating a valid measurement of OC has important policy implications, since valid indicators may improve the effectiveness of government and enforcement actions. Details: Milan, IT: Transcrime, 2014. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2014 at: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/measuring-oc-in-latin-america/ Year: 2014 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.transcrime.it/pubblicazioni/measuring-oc-in-latin-america/ Shelf Number: 132813 Keywords: Corruption Criminal CartelsGangs Organized Crime (Latin America) Violence |
Author: Maiga, Aissata Title: New Frontiers: Russian-Speaking Organized Crime in Latin America Summary: Russian-speaking organized crime is capitalizing on and flourishing in the "permissive environment" of Latin American countries. Principally involved in drug trafficking and money laundering, it is also colluding effectively with local criminal cartels. The Kremlin has initiated collaborative steps to counter organized crime in the region, but initiatives from EU countries are so far largely lacking in a domain that requires greater international cooperation. Details: Nacka, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013. 2p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief No. 133: Accessed November 13, 2014 at: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-maiga-kego-new-frontiers-russian-organized-crime-in-latin-america.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2013-maiga-kego-new-frontiers-russian-organized-crime-in-latin-america.pdf Shelf Number: 134086 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Latin America) |
Author: Charosky, Hernan Title: Transnational Criminal Networks and The Public Sector: Findings and Recommendations About Permeable Borders Summary: The aim of this document is to collect, present and assess points of juncture between Transnational Criminal Networks ("TCNs") and the public sector in a wide sense (political institutions, public administration and security agencies, public service agents), and propose recommendations. These points of juncture are heterogeneous and refer to different kinds of public sector entities and different levels of government: from the way in which parliaments work -in some of the cases referred here, in the interest of TCNs- to the informal agreements between municipal authorities and TCN bosses -from a blind eye to their activities to the active commitment of local police agents in criminal activities. Details: Bogota, Colombia: Vortex Foundation, 2014. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Vortex Working Paper no. 14: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_eaee567619174b9485011f83e5898a5c.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/522e46_eaee567619174b9485011f83e5898a5c.pdf Shelf Number: 144856 Keywords: Criminal CartelsCriminal Networks |
Author: Espach, Ralph Title: The Dilemma of Lawlessness: Organized Crime, Violence, Prosperity, and Security along Guatemala's Borders Summary: For centuries, the Central American region has been among the world's most important transit zones. The Spanish shuttled the gold, silver, and other valuables from Southeast Asia and from South America across the Panamanian isthmus. Later, the French and the Americans competed to control and improve that route with a water canal, either in Panama or Nicaragua. Since the emergence of the United States as a major economy and consumer market, the region has been a key zone for the northward flow of all kinds of products - legal and illegal. Economically, the countries of Central America, particularly northern Central America (including Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador), have traditionally been among the most unequal in the Americas. Throughout most of these countries' histories, political power and state resources were controlled by the same families and networks that owned most of the land and industries. Relatively few resources and little state attention were dedicated to improving the lives of the poor, especially in isolated rural areas. Except during infrequent instances of insurgency, civil war, or interstate conflict, border control or even preserving a state presence in rural areas in these regions was not an important concern. In practical terms, national territorial borders were unmarked and did not exist. What is today considered smuggling was a normal, everyday practice. Many border communities had closer economic ties to cities, agricultural zones, or economic infrastructure such as railroads or ports in countries across the border than they did to those within their own country. Moreover, most of the residents of these rural areas were indigenous and largely disconnected from the country in which they lived and the government that notionally had authority over them. In this way, most border zones in these countries have traditionally been "ungoverned," or "undergoverned," in terms of their relations with the national and provincial or departmental governments. Over the decades, numerous groups have taken advantage of the porousness of these borders, and the general lawlessness of these remote areas (many of which are heavily forested and/or mountainous), to elude governments or armed forces. In addition to the ever-present smugglers, armed insurgent groups from both the left and the right, as well as paramilitaries of all stripes, crossed borders to conduct their operations during the Cold War. The most recent, and by some accounts the most dangerous, type of actors to exploit these weakly governed, porous borders in northern Central America have been narcotics trafficking networks. Illegal drugs have been smuggled from the world's foremost coca production zone - the northern Andean foothills - to the world's richest and largest drug consumption market - the United States - since at least the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, however, an international crackdown on drug smuggling through the Caribbean region led Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico. The Colombians moved product through the region largely by buying the services of local trafficking networks. These networks were particularly well developed in Guatemala as a result of the intelligence and transport networks the military created during that country's civil war from the 1960s to the 1990s. Over time, Mexican trafficking networks grew into competitive cartels themselves and began to fight each other for control over valuable transport and smuggling routes. Mexico's largest cartels-including the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Zeta-grew their operations from merely trafficking the product of others to buying the product upstream and controlling its transit in Central America. Traditionally, Colombian- or Mexican-run trafficking cartels operated in Guatemala by buying the services of local trafficking networks, but around 2008 they began to seek to control routes themselves. Many of these routes lie along the Guatemalan coast, where drugs are brought in by boat and then transferred onto land for transit into Mexico. Other routes enter from Honduras, with the drugs being flown in from Venezuela or brought in via boat. Recently, there has been evidence not only of a broad presence of Mexican drug-trafficking networks across Guatemala but also of the expansion of their operations there, particularly into drug processing. They also sell more of their product in local markets, rather than shipping it onward, fueling local gang activity and urban violence. Details: Arlington, CA: CNA; Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Guatemala URL: https://www.cna.org/CNA_Files/PDF/TheDilemmaOfLawlessness.pdf Shelf Number: 144948 Keywords: Border SecurityCriminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingGang-Related ViolenceOrganized CrimeSmugglingViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Mexico's Out-of-Control Criminal Market Summary: This paper explores the trends, characteristics, and changes in the Mexican criminal market, in response to internal changes, government policies, and external factors. It explores the nature of violence and criminality, the behavior of criminal groups, and the effects of government responses. Over the past two decades, criminal violence in Mexico has become highly intense, diversified, and popularized, while the deterrence capacity of Mexican law enforcement remains critically low. The outcome is an ever more complex, multi-polar, and out-of-control criminal market that generates deleterious effects on Mexican society and makes it highly challenging for the Mexican state to respond effectively. Successive Mexican administrations have failed to sustainably reduce homicides and other violent crimes. Critically, the Mexican government has failed to rebalance power in the triangular relationship between the state, criminal groups, and society, while the Mexican population has soured on the anti-cartel project. Since 2000, Mexico has experienced extraordinarily high drug- and crime-related violence, with the murder rate in 2017 and again in 2018 breaking previous records. The fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups is both a purposeful and inadvertent effect of high-value targeting, which is a problematic strategy because criminal groups can replace fallen leaders more easily than insurgent or terrorist groups. The policy also disrupts leadership succession, giving rise to intense internal competition and increasingly younger leaders who lack leadership skills and feel the need to prove themselves through violence. Focusing on the middle layer of criminal groups prevents such an easy and violent regeneration of the leadership. But the Mexican government remains deeply challenged in middle-layer targeting due to a lack of tactical and strategic intelligence arising from corruption among Mexican law enforcement and political pressures that makes it difficult to invest the necessary time to conduct thorough investigations. In the absence of more effective state presence and rule of law, the fragmentation of Mexican criminal groups turned a multi-polar criminal market of 2006 into an ever more complex multi-polar criminal market. Criminal groups lack clarity about the balance of power among them, tempting them to take over one another's territory and engage in internecine warfare. The Mexican crime market's proclivity toward violence is exacerbated by the government's inability to weed out the most violent criminal groups and send a strong message that they will be prioritized in targeting. The message has not yet sunk in that violence and aggressiveness do not pay. For example, the destruction of the Zetas has been followed by the empowerment of the equally aggressive Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Like the Zetas, the Jalisco group centers its rule on brutality, brazenness, and aggressiveness. Like the Zetas and unlike the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG does not invest in and provide socio- economic goods and governance in order to build up political capital. Equally, the internal re-balancing among criminal groups has failed to weed out the most violent groups and the policy measures of the Mexican governments have failed to reduce the criminal groups' proclivity toward aggression and violence. The emergence of the CJNG has engulfed Mexico and other supply-chain countries, such as Colombia,in its war with the Sinaloa Cartel. The war between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG provides space for local criminal upstarts, compounds instability by shifting local alliances, and sets off new splintering within the two large cartels and among their local proxies. To the extent that violence has abated in particular locales, the de-escalation has primarily reflected a "narco-peace," with one criminal group able to establish control over a particular territory and its corruption networks. It is thus vulnerable to criminal groups' actions as well as to high-value targeting of top drug traffickers. In places such as Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and Monterrey, local law enforcement and anti-crime socio-economic policies helped in various degrees to reduce violence. When the narco-peace was undermined, the policies proved insufficient. At other times, the reduction of violence that accompanied a local narco-peace gave rise to policy complacency and diminished resources. Socio-economic policies to combat crime have spread resources too thinly across Mexico to be effective. Violence in Mexico has become diversified over the past decade, with drug trafficking groups becoming involved in widespread extortion of legal businesses, kidnapping, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and smuggling of migrants. That is partially a consequence of the fragmentation, as smaller groups are compelled to branch out into a variety of criminal enterprises. But for larger groups, extortion of large segments of society is not merely a source of money, but also of authority. Violence and criminality have also become "popularized," both in terms of the sheer number of actors and also the types of actors involved, such as "anti-crime" militias. Widespread criminality increases the coercive credibility of individual criminals and small groups, while hiding their identities. Low effective prosecution rates and widespread impunity tempt many individuals who would otherwise be law-abiding citizens to participate in crime. Anti-crime militias that have emerged in Mexico have rarely reduced violence in a sustained way. Often, they engage in various forms of criminality, including homicides, extortion, and human rights abuses against local residents, and they undermine the authority of the state. Government responses to the militias-including acquiescence, arrests, and efforts to roll them into state paramilitary forces-have not had a significant impact. In fact, the strength and emergence of militia groups in places such as Michoacan and Guerrero reflect a long-standing absence of the government, underdevelopment, militarization, and abuse of political power. In places such as Guerrero, criminality and militia formation has become intertwined with the U.S. opioid epidemic that has stimulated the expansion of poppy cultivation in Mexico. The over-prescription of opioids in the United States created a major addiction epidemic, with users turning to illegal alternatives when they were eventually cut off from prescription drugs. Predictably, poppy cultivation shot up in Mexico, reaching some 30,000 hectares in 2017. Areas of poppy cultivation are hotly contested among Mexican drug trafficking groups, with their infighting intensely exacerbating the insecurity of poor and marginalized poppy farmers. Efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation have often failed to sustainably reduce illicit crop cultivation and complicated policies to pacify these areas, often thrusting poppy farmers deeper into the hands of criminal groups that sponsor and protect the cultivation. Eradication is easier than providing poppy farmers with alternative livelihoods. Combined with the Trump administration's demands for eradication, the Enrique Peea Nieto administration, and Mexico historically, showed little interest in seriously pursuing a different path. Poppy eradication in Mexico does not shrink the supply of illegal opioids destined for the U.S. market, since farmers replant poppies after eradication and can always shift areas of production. The rise of fentanyl abuse in the United States, however, has suppressed opium prices in Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations and dealers prefer to traffic and sell fentanyl, mostly supplied to the United States from China, because of its bulk-potency-profit ratio. The CJNG became a pioneer in fentanyl smuggling through Mexico into the United States, but the Sinaloa Cartel rapidly developed its own fentanyl supply chain. Although the drug is deadly, the Sinaloa Cartel's means of distribution remain non- violent in the United States. Fentanyl enters the United States from Mexico through legal ports of entry. In the short term, fentanyl has not altered the dynamics of Mexico's criminal market, but in the long term, fentanyl can significantly upend global drug markets and the prioritization of drug control in U.S. agendas with other countries. If many users switch to synthetic drugs, the United States may lose interest in promoting eradication of drug crops. Such a switch would also weaken the power of criminal and insurgent groups who sponsor illicit crop cultivation. Even if they switch to the production of synthetic drugs, they will only have the capacity to sponsor the livelihoods of many fewer people, thus diminishing their political capital with local populations and making it less costly for the government to conduct counter-narcotics operations. Mexico's violence can decline in two ways. First, a criminal group can temporarily win enough turf and establish enough deterrence capacity to create a narco-peace, as has been the case so far. Alternatively, violence can decline when the state at last systematically builds up enough deterrence capacity against the criminals and realigns local populations with the state, from which they are now often alienated. Mexico must strive to achieve this objective. Details: Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute, 2019. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2019 at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Mexico URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190322_mexico_crime-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155192 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug MarketsDrug TraffickingFentanylHomicidesNarcoticsOpioidsOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and CrimeViolence |